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Abstract We investigate the political economy of IMF forecasts with data for 157 countries
(1999–2005). Generally, we find evidence of forecast bias in growth and inflation. Specif-
ically, we find that countries voting with the United States in the UN General Assembly
receive lower inflation forecasts as domestic elections approach. Countries with large loans
outstanding from the IMF also receive lower inflation forecasts, suggesting that the IMF en-
gages in “defensive forecasting.” Finally, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes receive
lower inflation forecasts, suggesting the IMF desires to preserve stability as inflation can
have detrimental effects under such an exchange rate regime.
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JEL Classification C23 · D72 · F33 · F34
1 Introduction
The IMF regularly forecasts major macroeconomic variables for many developed and de-
veloping countries. These forecasts, published biannually, are a key element in the Fund’s
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multilateral surveillance activities. Surveillance is usually considered by the IMF to be its
“most central and important activity” (Hacche 2007, p. 98). Indeed, with the importance of
IMF conditional lending fading, IMF surveillance may take on the role that conditionality
has played signaling to private investors a country’s “good performance” (see Marchesi and
Thomas 1999; Marchesi 2003). Given the considerable role of surveillance, it is vital that the
task of forecasting be performed accurately, in other words, that IMF forecasts be unbiased
and efficient.
The IMF bases its forecasts primarily on information the IMF staff gathers through con-
sultations with member countries (e.g., see IMF 2006). There is no question that the initial
projections are based on an econometric model.1 Subsequently, however, there is much lee-
way for political influence and IMF self-interest to enter into discretionary adjustments.
With this in mind, we evaluate the accuracy of IMF forecasts of GDP growth and in-
flation using panel data for individual developing countries. We choose to consider growth
and inflation forecasts because both play an important role in public discussions and are
easily interpreted. In contrast to most previous studies, which employ regional data for the
developing world, we use country-specific data, enabling us to test hypotheses that cannot
be tested on a regional basis.
Our major contribution is to identify the characteristics of countries receiving optimistic
and pessimistic forecasts. We consider the potential political and reputational motivations
of the IMF. We also consider reasons arising from the specific mandate of the IMF to ensure
the stability of the international monetary system.
Regarding politically strategic motivations, we consider the influence of the most pow-
erful members of the IMF. To the extent that governments benefit from optimistic economic
forecasts, the Fund’s major shareholders and their allies might be more likely to receive such
forecasts because of the way political power is wielded at the IMF. In comparison, countries
opposed to the major shareholders are likely to receive more pessimistic forecasts.
The Fund might also have other interests in providing biased forecasts. For developing
countries participating in IMF programs, for example, overly optimistic forecasts may serve
to justify Fund lending. The IMF may also care about its reputation as a good manager of
its resources. To put it bluntly, the Fund may engage in “defensive forecasting” because it
cares about getting repaid.
Finally, forecast bias may be driven by the IMF’s concern for worldwide economic sta-
bility. Since the IMF has the specific mandate of preserving the stability of the international
monetary system, it might want to avoid the responsibility of being blamed for self-fulfilling
prophecies. Its forecasts are thus likely to be more optimistic when economic stability is at
risk.
We continue as follows. The next section discusses the previous literature, and Sect. 3
presents our hypotheses. Section 4 tests for bias and inefficiency in IMF forecasts. Section 5
describes our data and the method we use to test our hypotheses. Our results are presented
in Sect. 6. A brief conclusion follows.
2 Literature overview
While research analyzing IMF forecasts is relatively new, there is a large and growing body
of literature addressing how political and bureaucratic interests influence the lending activ-
ities of the IMF. We suspect that many of the arguments about IMF lending may also apply
1See IMF (1998) for a detailed description of the IMF’s MULTIMOD forecasting model.
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to its forecasting. Thus, we first review the literature on IMF lending before turning to the
recent findings on IMF forecasting.
2.1 Background
We begin with political influence.2 A member’s influence at the IMF is explicitly tied to
the size of its economy, and the top five shareholders at the IMF—the United States, Japan,
Germany, France and the United Kingdom—essentially control major Fund decisions.3 With
about 17% of the total votes, the United States by itself has veto power over major decisions
at the IMF, including the appointment of the IMF’s Managing Director, which requires an
85% supermajority.
There is ample evidence that the Fund’s major shareholders use their influence to pur-
sue political objectives.4 Thacker (1999), for example, shows that governments that vote
more consistently with the United States on key issues in the United Nations General As-
sembly are more likely to participate in IMF programs—presumably the IMF loan acts as a
reward. Stone (2002, 2004) shows that governments favored by the United States (as mea-
sured by the amount of US foreign aid disbursed to a country) receive lighter punishments
for noncompliance with policy conditions under IMF programs. The recent empirical lit-
erature shows that developing countries get better treatment from the IMF when they have
closer ties to the United States and other G-7 countries, as measured by their voting behavior
in the UN General Assembly (Barro and Lee 2005; Vreeland 2005; Oatley and Yackee 2004;
Dreher and Jensen 2007; Copelovitch 2007) and while serving on the UN Security Council
(Dreher et al. 2006).5
Beyond political pressures, many argue that the IMF has perverse incentives to defend its
lending activities. Marchesi and Sabani (2007a, 2007b), for example, argue that the Fund’s
concern for its reputation as a good monitor/advisor discourages it from punishing govern-
ments that fail to comply with the conditions associated with its lending programs. They
find that such departures from the social optimum are more likely for countries that have a
longer relationship with the Fund. Similarly, Goldsbrough et al. (2002, Table 2) show that
the performance criteria for the programs of prolonged users often have an optimistic bias,
especially regarding projections of real GDP growth and export growth.
It has also been argued that the IMF engages in “defensive lending,” throwing good
money after bad to protect outstanding loans. To avoid reporting losses on its balance sheets,
the IMF may have a perverse incentive to extend new loans to borrowers with repayment
difficulties to ensure that the existing loans are paid back on schedule (Ramcharan 2001,
2003).
The literature above on IMF lending introduces several hypotheses that may also apply to
IMF forecasting. Just as the IMF lends to politically powerful countries, countries with long
histories with the IMF, and countries already deeply in debt to the IMF, the Fund may be
2See Steinwand and Stone (2008) for a recent survey of political influences on the Fund.
3These members alone control nearly 40% of the vote share and are the only countries that automatically
have seats on the IMF’s 24-member Executive Board. The rest of the world vies for representation through
elections and shared seats.
4See Fratianni and Pattison (2005) for a recent survey. See Gisselquist (1981), Loxley (1986) and Andersen
et al. (2006) for anecdotal evidence.
5Also consider Broz and Hawes (2006), Faini and Grilli (2004), Rieffel (2003), Woods (2003). For similar
evidence regarding the World Bank, see Frey et al. (1985), Frey and Schneider (1986), Weck-Hannemann
and Schneider (1991) and Dreher et al. (2008).
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tempted to provide such countries with biased forecasts of economic performance. Indeed,
as we show below, the nascent literature on IMF forecasting confirms that some of these
hypotheses are plausible.
2.2 Previous studies of IMF forecasts
Previous studies of IMF surveillance have used statistical tests to determine the accuracy of
the forecasts published in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) (IMF various years).
Among others, see Artis (1988, 1997), Barrionuevo (1993), Beach et al. (1999), Loungani
(2000), Batchelor (2000), Pons (2000), Aldenhoff (2007), and Timmermann (2007). In many
of these studies, the IMF forecast error is compared to that of some other national research
institute expected to be more independent, such as Consensus Economics (an international
economic organization in London). Whereas the Artis and Loungani studies find little differ-
ence between the IMF and Consensus prediction errors, the Batchelor study shows that the
IMF’s growth forecasts are biased towards optimism and that the IMF’s inflation forecasts
are actually less biased towards pessimism than the Consensus Economics forecasts.
Beach et al. (1999) find that IMF forecasts of GDP and inflation for major industrialized
countries are actually unbiased and efficient.6 For developing regions, however, they find
that the IMF has been overly optimistic: WEO forecasts overestimated output and underes-
timated inflation. Furthermore, these authors also find that the error term increases with the
amount of IMF lending a region receives. This suggests that IMF forecasts may be adjusted
to support its lending activity. While this kind of “defensive forecasting” may be disappoint-
ing, the result stands to reason. IMF loans are typically tied to policy conditions. Forecasts
for countries receiving IMF loans may mirror the expected outcome of the policies sug-
gested by the IMF, and this bias would result in forecasts that are overly optimistic. A bias
in the other direction would be quite strange. It would indicate that the IMF itself expects its
own recommended policies to be ineffective.
In contrast to the Beach et al. (1999) study, recent evidence from Aldenhoff (2007) in-
dicates that IMF growth forecasts are distorted for both developing and industrial regions
as well. For developing countries, Aldenhoff attributes the bias to the IMF’s interests in
promoting promising prospects for countries participating in IMF-sponsored programs. The
IMF staff may be tempted to produce optimistic predictions for the general survival and
growth of its lending organization. As for industrial countries, which can use their influence
at the IMF to obtain favorable outcomes, the optimistic bias is attributed to political factors:
forecasts attract public attention and optimism may help incumbents win reelection. Thus,
the IMF may opportunistically make overly optimistic predictions, or it may be pressured to
do so by powerful member states.
Broadly consistent with this view, Timmermann (2007) finds that WEO forecasts of GDP
growth display a tendency for systematic overprediction, and he finds a bias of the under-
prediction of inflation.
The literature cited above indicates that IMF forecasts suffer from bias and inefficiency.
While the studies have made important contributions, most of them are limited in that they
consider individual country forecasts only for the Group of Seven (G-7), relying on re-
gional aggregates for the rest of the world (with the exception of Timmermann 2007). The
broader literature on the IMF indicates, however, that specific countries may receive favor-
able treatment under specific conditions. Thus, we propose to analyze IMF forecasts using
country-specific data.
6They find the same for the balance of payments on the current account.
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3 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses
Previous literature on IMF forecasts indicates a bias towards optimism. In this section we
develop hypotheses as to why specific countries may receive optimistic forecasts for growth
and inflation. We employ a public choice approach to the IMF analyzing the political and
economic incentives and constraints facing the organization.
What drives the IMF and to whom is the organization accountable? There are various
schools of thought regarding this question. We believe each has merit and derive several
hypotheses from them. According to one political economy view, the IMF is beholden to
its major shareholders who use (or abuse) the IMF to pursue short-term political objectives
(e.g., Thacker 1999). A related public choice perspective contends that accountability in in-
ternational bureaucracies is tenuous (e.g., Vaubel 1991). A long chain of command leaves
room for the IMF staff to pursue objectives that maximize their budget. Still another perspec-
tive acknowledges that the IMF is staffed by professionals who are bound by the mandate
as laid out in its Articles of Agreement (e.g., Willett 2000).
Thus, our analysis distinguishes between three sets of explanations for optimistic fore-
casts: (1) politically strategic, (2) defensive forecasting, and (3) stability/mandate oriented.
We consider each in turn.
3.1 Politically strategic hypotheses
The first set of hypotheses derive from politically strategic arguments, according to which
the Fund may be pressured, either explicitly or implicitly, by the governments of the member
states to make overly optimistic economic forecasts.
We suspect that governments are interested in optimistic forecasts, as economic envi-
ronments perceived to be “good” may increase approval by their citizens. True, deviations
from overly optimistic forecasts might harm politicians in the longer run. The public may
have high expectations and see government policy as failing. Yet, as politicians are usu-
ally rather short-sighted (e.g., Lagerspetz 1999), we think it is likely that politicians do—on
average—want the future economic environment to look as positive as possible.
Because the IMF depends on the support of its member governments, the staff may be
tempted to produce forecasts biased in their favor. Alternatively, the staff may be directly
pressured by governments. Whether and to what extent the IMF will serve the interests of
governments, however, depends on the power they enjoy at the Fund, and the support they
receive from other powerful members (Dreher 2004).7 As Bird and Rowlands (2003) argue,
a government’s power to negotiate depends greatly on the willingness of other countries to
support it. So, governments with a large share of the votes at the IMF are likely to receive
beneficial treatment, as are countries closely allied with these powerful countries. Power
may also depend on the size of outstanding loans a country has from the IMF. According to
Gould (2003, 2006), the IMF responds to pressure from private banks, as evidenced by the
fact that IMF programs include conditions that support their interests. To the extent that the
private banks benefit from optimistic forecasts in a country, governments important to such
institutions may receive favorable forecasts from the IMF.
Arguably, optimistic forecasts are more important at some times than at others. In elec-
tion years, the benefits of positive forecasts are obvious. Vaubel (1991) contends that the
7We should also note that there is interplay between the Fund and national authorities as advanced economies
and the largest developing countries provide a full set of projections for each WEO exercise while the smallest
countries provide updates of key variables only.
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IMF uses optimistic forecasts to please member governments facing elections. Forecasts at-
tract public attention and may influence the way voters evaluate the policy performances
of their governments: optimistic forecasts may help the incumbent to win elections. We
expect, therefore, incumbents to be especially interested in optimistic forecasts prior to a
national election. As Aldenhoff’s (2007) time series analysis for the United States shows,
over-optimism is indeed significantly more prevalent prior to elections. We expect to find a
similar pattern for other countries that are important to the IMF.
Based on the politically strategic arguments, we thus expect:
Hypothesis 1 The greater a country’s direct influence at the Fund, the more optimistic the
IMF’s forecasts are for that country.
Hypothesis 2 Allies of the Fund’s major stakeholders receive more optimistic IMF fore-
casts.
Hypothesis 3 Major IMF shareholders and their allies receive more optimistic forecasts at
election time.
3.2 Defensive forecasting hypotheses
The foregoing set of hypotheses assumes that the IMF is accountable to its shareholders.
Certainly, the organization is held accountable to an extent, but accountability is not perfect.
According to the public choice approach (Vaubel 1986, 1996), principal-agent problems
plague international financial institutions, leaving ample room for bureaucrats to pursue
private interests in maximizing their budgets by extending and defending their lending op-
erations.8
Thus, our second set of hypotheses focuses on the IMF’s incentives to make optimistic
forecasts in order to sustain its lending activity in developing countries and to protect its
reputation as a competent international financial organization. Such motivations may lead
the IMF to engage in “defensive forecasting.”
The IMF may forecast optimistically hoping to defend outstanding IMF credit. This argu-
ment follows from ideas about “defensive lending,” discussed above, where the Fund lends
to countries so deeply in debt they may otherwise not be able to make their next scheduled
repayment. The Fund may decide to extend new loans to borrowers with repayment difficul-
ties to ensure that existing debt is serviced on schedule, in order to avoid reporting a loss in
its balance sheets.
If the country does not adopt policy changes to ameliorate its economic situation, of
course, rolling over the debt simply postpones the default crisis. Therefore, defensive lend-
ing cannot be explained by standard economic considerations, unless postponing default
will come at a relatively lower pecuniary cost due to, for example, catalytic finance (Morris
and Shin 2006) or to future debt relief programs (Ramcharan 2001, 2003).
8Vaubel (1996, 2006) provides evidence that both the IMF and the World Bank suffer from bureaucratic
inefficiencies. He argues that the dilution of voting power, which has occurred as the memberships of the
organizations have grown, has undermined the incentives of principals to check bureaucratic growth and
waste. For a discussion of the long chain of principal-agent relationships at the IMF, which further exacerbate
accountability problems, see Vreeland (2003, 2007).
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The “career concerns” theory may explain the Fund’s defensive lending.9 Current IMF
officials have a relatively short horizon within the organization, and they pursue objectives
different from the institution as a whole. As with any public-sector job, opportunities for
promotion and future employment in the private sector are major motivations to expend
effort in the current job (Dewatripont et al. 1999). Therefore, in order to avoid some “private”
cost, after a borrower’s inability to pay has become public, staff officials might opt to roll
over the share of debt owed to the Fund.
We then suspect the IMF may intentionally provide positive bias in its forecasting. As
countries with a higher stock of IMF debt relative to the total amount of outstanding IMF
credit are the most likely to receive defensive loans, we expect them to receive defensive
forecasts too.
There are also other ways in which the IMF may use forecasts to defend its lending. In
particular, Marchesi and Sabani (2007a, 2007b) explicitly model the political costs of the
dual role played by the Fund, acting at the same time as a lender and as a monitor/advisor
of economic policy. To the extent that the IMF is responsible for the bad economic perfor-
mance of a country, a borrower’s inability to repay may hurt the reputation of the IMF as the
steward of sound economic policy. Reputational costs can be severe for the IMF. For exam-
ple, the most powerful Fund members might refrain from increasing the Fund’s resources if
its reputation as good manager of “public resources” is damaged.
When the IMF has lent to a country that has continued to experience poor economic
performance, the IMF may find its reputation in jeopardy for at least three reasons. First,
the Fund may indeed have prescribed the wrong economic policies. Second, the Fund may
have been incapable of detecting deviations from the prescribed policies. Third, the Fund
may have been incapable of credibly threatening the interruption of financial assistance to
enforce policy changes.
For all of these reasons, the IMF looks bad when it is forced to cut off a country from
borrowing because of the country’s poor economic performance. Failure to refinance a
country—particularly countries with longer histories of borrowing from the Fund—confirm
the IMF’s failure as a lender and a policy monitor/advisor, since this outcome is partly
caused by the past advice of the IMF. The empirical results of Marchesi and Sabani (2007b)
show, indeed, that a longer history of IMF lending does increase the probability of addi-
tional IMF loan disbursements. Therefore, the desire to justify its lending activity may lead
the IMF to over-optimism when engaging in surveillance. Specifically, we expect that the
longer the relationship with the borrowing country, the stronger the effect on forecasting.
Based on the defensive forecasting arguments, we thus expect:
Hypothesis 4 Countries with a higher stock of debt owed to the Fund (relative to the total
amount of IMF credit) receive more optimistic IMF forecasts.
Hypothesis 5 Countries with longer relations with the IMF receive more optimistic fore-
casts.
3.3 Stability/mandate hypotheses
The third set of hypotheses is related to the IMF’s primary responsibility of overseeing
the stability of the international monetary system. One basic principle of this “mandate” is
9While moral hazard and adverse selection represent explicit incentive schemes, implicit incentives, in the
form of career concerns, play a key role in all organizations.
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that the actions of the IMF certainly should not spread financial crises. This can be viewed
as a goal of the organization as a whole, or it could result from career considerations of
individuals on the hierarchically organized IMF staff. Since forecasts draw primarily on
information the IMF staff gathers through consultations with member countries, members
of the staff are directly involved in the process of forecasting. The IMF staff may thus have
incentives to downplay risk so that they are not held personally responsible for spreading
financial crises.10
Which countries are likely to receive optimistic forecasts in the pursuit of stability? Our
predictions about growth and inflation depend on the specific ways in which forecasts about
these variables can precipitate crises.
Regarding inflation, it is widely believed that monetary policy is mainly about expecta-
tions—particularly coordinating expectations. To the extent that a negative forecast can
actually precipitate crises, the IMF may systematically tend towards optimism. An overly
pessimistic forecast would lead to expectations of high inflation, unnecessarily putting ex-
cessive pressure on the exchange rate. This is particularly true for countries under a fixed
exchange rate regime. Flexible exchange rates can withstand slight deviations, whereas the
announcement of high inflation for a fixed currency could completely undermine its value.
Since financial crises are often associated with countries under a fixed exchange rate regime,
and since the expectations of high inflation would lead to pressure on the exchange rate, we
expect to find more optimistic forecasts for countries with fixed exchange rates.
Overly pessimistic growth forecasts could precipitate crises in other situations. The ex-
pectation of low growth could affect debt sustainability, undermining the stability of the
international monetary system. If a forecast for growth is low enough, it could provoke a
stampede of creditors. This is particularly true for short-term and dollar-denominated sov-
ereign debt. Given the correlation between financial crises and the ratio of debt to GDP
(especially short-term and dollar-denominated sovereign debt) we expect a tendency of the
IMF to announce more optimistic growth forecasts for countries with higher short-term debt
to GDP ratios.
Based on the stability mandate forecasting arguments, we thus expect:
Hypothesis 6 Countries with a fixed exchange rate regime have more optimistic inflation
forecasts.
Hypothesis 7 Countries with a higher (short-term) debt to GDP ratio have more optimistic
growth forecasts.
In order to test the hypotheses laid out above, we employ a wide range of explanatory
variables. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses and presents the definitions and sources of our
explanatory variables. Before testing our explanations of bias, however, we first explore how
much overall forecast bias, if any, there is. The next section tests for the bias and efficiency
of IMF forecasts.
10In their seminal paper on strategic information transmission, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that when
an informed agent has to send a signal based on its private information to an uninformed agent and when the
two agents’ objectives differ, communication is noisy. Among others, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) develop
a theory of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior.
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Table 1 Variables definition
Hypotheses Proxies Variables Source
H1: Direct influence in
the Fund
“Power” GDP World Bank (2006a)
H2: Indirect influence in
the Fund
Influence of private cred-
itors
Arrears on private debt World Bank (2006b)
Country’s standing with
the Fund’s most impor-
tant shareholder (United
States)
Percentage of UN Gen-
eral Assembly votes
in line with the United
States
Voeten (2004)
Temporary members of
the UN Security Council
Dummy for temporary
UNSC membership
Dreher et al. (2006)
H3: More optimistic
forecasts at election time
Influence of elections Share of the year prior to
elections
Dreher and Vaubel
(2007)
Influence of voting in
line with the United
States prior to elections
Interaction between the
UN voting variable and
the pre-election variable
H4: Defensive forecast-
ing due to the political
costs of a default
Influence of a higher
stock of debt owed to the
Fund
IMF loan share IMF (2006) and IMF
webpage
H5: Defensive forecast-
ing due to “reputational
effect”
Influence of the length of
the relationship with the
IMF
Number of past consecu-
tive arrangements
IMF (2006) and IMF
webpage
H6: Influence of the IMF
mandate on inflation
Influence of the IMF
mandate of ensuring sta-
bility on inflation
Fixed exchange rate
regime
World Bank (2006b)
H7: Influence of the IMF
mandate on growth
Influence of the IMF
mandate of ensuring sta-
bility on growth
Short-term to GDP ratio World Bank (2006b)
4 Testing for bias and efficiency
We begin our analysis by replicating the previous work on IMF economic forecasts with our
data. Timmermann (2007) finds that the overprediction bias for GDP growth and the un-
derprediction bias for inflation are stronger in the longer time horizon forecasts. We believe
this is because the longer the time horizon the greater the room for discretionary forecasting.
Moreover, the bias is less likely to be remembered by the public at the time of realization.
Thus, we focus on one of the longer run forecasts. The WEO publishes four types of fore-
casts: spring forecasts for the current and the following year, and fall forecasts for the current
and the following year. We focus on fall forecasts for the following year. Our annual data are
organized in an unbalanced panel comprising a maximum of 157 developed and developing
countries over the period 1999–2005.
The accuracy of a forecast is based on the properties of the forecast error. A forecast is
considered to be accurate if it is unbiased and efficient.
A forecast is unbiased if its average deviation from the outcome is zero. Bias may be
identified by referring to the significance of the mean forecast error, as indicated by a simple
regression of the error on a constant term, testing whether it is significantly different from
zero (Holden and Peel 1990).
For each country i during year t , define eit ≡ Fit −Rit , where e represents forecast error,
F denotes the forecast, and R denotes its respective realization. The test for biasedness is
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based on the regression expressed as:
eit = μ + uit , (1)
with uit being an i.i.d. residual and where μ is a constant term. We define the mean forecast
error (ME) as:
ME = 1
T · I
I∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
eit , (2)
with T being the number of years and I the number of countries in our sample.
Forecast efficiency implies that the deviation between the outcome and the projection is
not related to information available at the time the projection was made (Barrionuevo 1993;
Holden and Peel 1990). This condition is tested by measuring the statistical significance
of the co-movements between the deviation of the outcome of the forecast and the forecast
itself (the β-test), and the co-movement between the deviation of the outcome of the forecast
in the current period and that in the previous period (the ρ-test). We estimate β using a
least-squares regression of the forecast error on a constant term and the forecast (see (3)).
We estimate ρ with a regression of the current-period forecast error on a constant term and
the previous period error (see (4)). Therefore, a condition for efficiency is that both β and ρ
be zero.
eit = αi + βiFit + uit , (3)
eit = γi + ρieit−1 + uit , (4)
where e and F denote forecast error and forecast, respectively, and α and γ are constant
terms (with uit again being an i.i.d. residual).
If β and ρ are both different from zero, the inefficiency is partly due to the way in which
new information is incorporated into projected values and partly because the present errors
are highly correlated with past ones (Barrionuevo 1993; Pons 2000).
Table 2 reports the results for high-income OECD countries and other countries sepa-
rately, as classified by the World Bank (2006a). As can be seen from columns (1) and (2),
IMF forecasts are indeed biased. In high-income OECD countries, inflation forecasts are
optimistic. They are significantly biased downwards at the 1% level of significance. Specif-
ically, the average inflation forecast in those countries is 0.24 percentage points lower than
actual realizations. Compared to the average rate of inflation over this sample of countries
(2.25%), this is a reduction of about 10%. The Fund’s growth forecasts, in contrast, are too
pessimistic for non-OECD countries, with a coefficient significant at the 5% level. The fore-
cast is, on average, 0.36 percentage points lower as compared to realizations. Compared to
the average of our sample countries (4.8%), this is a reduction of about 7.5%. We detect no
bias for OECD growth forecasts or non-OECD inflation forecasts.
Turning to our tests for efficiency, column (3) shows that the previous error in estimating
inflation contributes to explaining the current error both for OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. The effect is positive and significant at the 1% level. Column (4) shows the same
regarding growth forecasts for non-OECD countries. As columns (5) and (6) show, in non-
OECD countries, the magnitude of the error significantly depends on the magnitude of the
forecast itself, with higher forecasts implying bigger mistakes. We do not find the same for
OECD countries in this case.
Our results confirm, to an extent, previous studies that show bias and inefficiency in
IMF forecasts. The bias is not across all estimates. Yet, the existence of an overall bias is
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Table 2 Bias and efficiency, OLS
Bias Previous error Forecast Average realization
Inflation Growth Inflation Growth Inflation Growth Inflation Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OECD countries −0.237 0.147 0.299 0.122 0.008 −0.070 2.248 2.581
(3.54)a (1.31) (4.08)a (1.56) (0.11) (0.64)
Number of countries 22 23 22 23 22 23 22 23
Number of 146 152 130 136 146 152 146 152
observations
Non-OECD countries 0.248 −0.362 0.458 0.142 0.319 0.468 9.339 4.815
(0.41) (2.25)b (10.27)a (2.81)a (31.81)a (9.59)a
Number of countries 133 146 133 141 133 146 133 146
Number of 562 600 427 451 562 600 562 600
observations
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)–(6) is the forecast error (forecast minus realization); t-statistics
are reported in parentheses
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
not necessary for our subsequent analysis. Even if, on average, bias is zero, it is possible
that forecasts for some types of situations are systematically high, while for others they are
systematically low. This is the very reason we employ country-specific data. The next section
presents our strategy for testing whether bias is related to any of our previously presented
hypotheses.
5 Method and data
We test our hypotheses by regressing the forecast error on the variables suggested above.
Specifically, we test:
eit = α + β1eit−1 + β2HYPit + β3Fit + ηi + uit , (5)
where eit represents the forecast error in country i at year t , and HYP is a vector containing
the variables introduced above (see Table 1). Note that we also include the level of the fore-
cast (F) and the lagged dependent variable, given their significance in most specifications
above. Finally, ηi are country fixed effects.11
A potential problem with this specification is that the within-groups estimator is biased
and inconsistent in the presence of a lagged dependent variable in a short panel (Nickell
1981). Thus, as a test for robustness, we employ the system GMM estimator as suggested
by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
The dynamic panel GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to
11The Hausman test rejects a random effects specification. We also tested time dummies, but they are not
jointly significant, so we do not include them.
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obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent data. It is considered
most appropriate in the presence of endogenous regressors. Results are based on the two-
step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005)
finite sample correction. We apply the Sargan–Hansen test on the validity of the instruments
used (amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates) and the Arellano–Bond test
of second-order autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data in order for the estima-
tor to be consistent. We treat the lagged dependent variable and the economic variables as
endogenous and all other variables as predetermined. To anticipate the results, the Sargan–
Hansen test and the Arellano–Bond test do not reject these specifications at conventional
levels of significance.
Turning to the variables employed to test our hypotheses (the HYP vector), political
“power” (H1) is proxied by (log) GDP, following Dreher (2004).12 Both a country’s own
(direct) influence in the Fund and support by other countries arguably rise with the size of
its economy. Moreover, countries with higher GDP are more important for the world econ-
omy. This variable is measured in constant 2000 US$, taken from the World Bank’s (2006a)
World Development Indicators. Ideally, we would also employ a country’s “quota,” the cap-
ital subscription each member holds on deposit at the IMF that directly determines its voting
power. However, given that our analysis includes dummies for each country and that quotas’
variability is very limited over time, we cannot use it.13
We test for the influence of private creditors (H2), suggested by Gould (2003, 2006), by
including countries’ arrears on private debt, taken from the World Bank (2006b). Sometimes
governments press the IMF to lend to countries that are in arrears to them or to their banks
(Dreher 2004). The Fund might want to present an optimistic forecast in order to avoid
outright default.
Next, we employ two proxies for countries’ standing with the Fund’s most important
stakeholder (H2). We follow the bulk of literature and employ data on voting coincidence in
the UN General Assembly as provided by Voeten (2004). In particular, we follow Thacker
(1999), coding votes in agreement with the United States as 1, votes in disagreement as 0,
and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are then divided by the total
number of votes in each year. This results in a variable ranging from zero to one, with zero
indicating total disagreement with the U.S., and one showing full agreement.
Clearly, the amount of effort a country puts into influencing others will depend on the im-
portance of a vote. Not all votes in the General Assembly are likely to be of great importance
to the United States. Focusing the analysis on a subset of votes the United States considers
of particular importance might thus be superior. However, inclusion of all votes has also
been defended. Wittkopf (1973) states that none of the alternatives focusing on “important”
votes is preferable to the general approach. Wittkopf replicates his overall results including
only those votes on which the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed, finding that
12Descriptive statistics are reported in the Appendix.
13As a proxy for power, we use GDP because overall GDP is used in the formulation of vote shares at the
IMF. An alternative approach would be to use GDP per capita, although this would really be a measure
of economic development, not voting power at the IMF. China and Russia, for example, have much larger
vote shares than Sweden and Switzerland. Replacing GDP by GDP per capita, however, does not qualitatively
change the results that we present below. It turns out that overall GDP is not a robustly significant determinant
of IMF forecasts and neither is GDP per capita. While not robust, both have counterintuitive effects that are
statistically significant in some specifications. We discuss these below with reference to GDP. The results with
GDP per capita are available on request. Importantly, the other main findings that we present with respect to
our hypotheses hold regardless of the choice between GDP and GDP per capita (they also hold when both
variables are included).
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the results do not differ substantially from the analysis including all votes. Similarly, he
replicates the previous analysis of Russett (1967), and also finds no substantial differences
between “important” votes and all votes. Moreover, while the U.S. State Department pro-
vides a classification of votes it considers of particular importance, the transmission of U.S.
foreign policy preferences from the State Department to the IMF is not necessarily a direct
one (Thacker 1999), as it is mainly the Treasury controlling the IMF (Kahler 1990). The
State Department’s preferences might thus not give a good indication as to actual lobbying
efforts. We thus follow most of the recent literature and include all votes in our analysis
(e.g., Dreher and Sturm 2006).
The recent work in Dreher et al. (2006) suggests an additional proxy for US and other
major Fund members’ interests. Their analysis shows that non-permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council are more likely to receive IMF programs and fewer condi-
tions under these programs. They attribute this to the influence of the Fund’s major share-
holders, bribing or rewarding temporary members of the Security Council to vote according
to their interests. Consequently, we include temporary Security Council membership as an
additional variable.
In testing the influence of elections for important countries (H3), we include a variable
measuring the fraction of a certain year that is within 12 months prior to a national (legisla-
tive or executive) election, and include its interaction with a measure of country importance.
To capture the importance of a country, we use the previously mentioned variable capturing
voting in line with the United States in the UN General Assembly. Data on elections are
taken from Dreher and Vaubel (2007), based on Beck et al. (1999), and have been updated
employing various sources. So observations are available until 2006. The underlying idea is
that the closer the elections for important countries, the stronger the bias in optimism should
be.
Our first defensive forecasting hypothesis (H4) is tested by including each country’s out-
standing credit as a percentage of total credit outstanding under all IMF facilities (as pro-
vided by the World Bank 2006b).
For our other defensive forecasting hypothesis (H5), the duration of the Fund’s rela-
tionship with a country is proxied by a variable that progressively numbers the years spent
consecutively by a country under a Fund arrangement, since 1970.14
Our classification of exchange rate regimes (H6) follows Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005). They provide an index of de facto exchange rates on a scale from one to five, with
higher values reflecting more rigid exchange rate systems. Short-term debt relative to GDP
(H7), finally, is taken from the World Bank’s (2006b) Global Development Finance.
The next section reports the results.
6 Results
We estimate our panel for a maximum of 157 countries for the period 1999 to 2005 both
by OLS with country-specific effects and with GMM.15 Table 3 presents the results of the
14When the IMF program spell is interrupted this variable goes to zero and, as soon as a new program begins
(after an interval of at least one year), we start counting again. See Marchesi and Sabani (2007b), Przeworski
and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003).
15Since the hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is rejected by the data, we estimate a fixed effects
linear models with an AR(1) disturbance.
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Table 3 Explaining the bias in INFLATION forecasts
HP1 HP2 HP3 HP4 ALL HP ALL HP
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast (t) 1.083 1.109 1.098 1.102 1.119 0.140
(16.94)a (16.89)a (16.89)a (16.70)a (18.42)a (2.34)b
GDP (log) 0.068 0.915 0.895 0.982 0.378 0.364
(0.05) (0.64) (0.63) (0.68) (0.43) (1.23)
Arrears (relative to GDP) −43.950 −45.928 −49.988 −75.578 27.180
(1.42) (1.50) (1.58) (2.71)a (0.66)
UNSC dummy 0.320 0.200 0.117 0.204 1.240
(0.27) (0.17) (0.10) (0.18) (1.07)
Voting with United States −21.158 −21.500 −21.747 −2.496 −3.213
(2.24)b (2.28)b (2.30)b (0.27) (0.80)
Pre-election period 6.069 6.123 6.491 5.768
(2.18)b (2.18)b (2.43)b (2.72)a
Voting*pre-election −11.202 −11.196 −12.362 −11.056
(1.83)c (1.81)c (2.15)b (2.63)a
IMF loan share −32.755 −26.847 −33.032
(0.47) (0.42) (3.04)a
Consecutive IMF −0.039 0.103 0.003
arrangements (0.13) (0.37) (0.01)
Fixed exchange rate −0.647 −1.112
(1.98)b (2.02)b
Lagged dependent −0.006
variable (0.05)
Constant −8.367 −22.101 −21.621 −23.336 −12.826 −4.423
(0.41) (1.01) (1.00) (1.06) (0.91) (0.68)
Observations 390 390 384 384 359 361
Number of countries 148 148 142 142 131 132
Arellano-Bond-Test (p-level) 0.14
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level) 1.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). OLS regressions include fixed
country dummies; t-statistics are reported in parentheses
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
cSignificant at 10%
estimation of (5) for the determinants of inflation bias. Table 4 presents robustness tests.
Tables 5 and 6 replicate the analysis for economic growth forecasts.
First, consider our primary findings for inflation (Table 3). Each column adds further vari-
ables testing our hypotheses, while column (5) shows the full model (estimated with OLS).
All of the models here include the forecast variable. Consistent with the results of our test
for efficiency (Table 2), the forecast error rises with the forecast itself. Forecasts of higher
rates of inflation are associated with greater bias.
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Turning to our main variables of interest, inflation forecasts are more optimistic for coun-
tries with higher arrears on private debt, in line with our expectations. The result is signifi-
cant at the 1% level when we control for other variables.
Interestingly, we find that inflation forecasts generally are more pessimistic at election
time but are more optimistic for closer friends of the United States. Calculating the mar-
ginal effects of this interaction (as displayed in Fig. 1a) the results show that the marginal
effect of the election variable (when it changes from zero to one) is 5.2 percentage points
for countries voting at the minimum value of the UN voting variable (0.10). The interac-
tion is significant at the 5% level (not shown in the table). At the maximum value for the
UN voting variable (0.95), however, the marginal effect of the election variable is −5.3 per-
centage points, although this effect just fails to be significant at the 10% level (p-value of
0.112). As can be seen in Fig. 1b, however, the marginal effects for UN voting at the mini-
mum and maximum of the election index fail to be significant at conventional levels (as the
90% confidence intervals include zero). As for the positive effect of the election variable
itself, this is consistent with the hypothesis of the political monetary cycle (e.g., Dreher and
Vaubel 2007): the IMF expects inflation to increase following elections. Apparently, how-
ever, for countries that do not vote with the United States at the UN, their expectations are
too pessimistic.
Countries with fixed exchange rates also obtain better inflation forecasts, as the coeffi-
cient of the variable for a fixed exchange rate regime is negative and significant at the 1%
level. This result confirms the hypothesis that the IMF is more willing to produce optimistic
inflation forecasts for countries that are more exposed to the risk of financial crises due to
their exchange rate regime. Note that an alternative to the stability/mandate interpretation of
this result is that the IMF staff may simply place more faith in fixed exchange rate regimes
than they should.16 If a fixed exchange rate works as it should, one might expect little infla-
Fig. 1 Marginal effect on the bias in INFLATION forecasts, Table 3, column (5). The graph depicts 90%
confidence intervals
16We are grateful to Frances Rosenbluth for this suggestion.
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tion. Due to the large-n nature of this study, we cannot know if the IMF staff intentionally
manipulates the inflation forecasts of countries with fixed exchange rates to help avert cri-
sis, or whether they genuinely expect such regimes to have lower inflation. Either way, such
regimes experience a systematic bias. Specifically, a one point increase in the (five-point)
exchange rate indicator reduces the inflation forecast by 0.65 percentage points.
In contrast to our expectations, the size of a country’s economy (measured by GDP) and
temporary membership in the UN Security Council do not matter for the forecast bias. In
addition, all IMF-related variables are completely insignificant. Neither the amount of debt
owed to the Fund (relative to the total amount of Fund credit) nor the number of years spent
consecutively under an IMF arrangement affect the forecast bias.
In column (6) of Table 3 we replicate the analysis employing the consistent GMM es-
timator. Note that the Sargan and Arellano–Bond tests do not reject the specification at
conventional levels of significance. As can be seen, the lagged dependent variable fails to
be significant at conventional levels, supporting the validity of our previous OLS estimates.
The OLS results displayed in column (5) are generally confirmed—with two exceptions.
The coefficient for the amount of arrears on private debt is not significant, and inflation fore-
casts are significantly lower for countries with a greater shares of the IMF loan portfolio.
Arguably, the latter finding provides evidence that the IMF cares about its reputation as a
good resource manager. To avoid the appearance of financing poorly performing countries,
it is tempted to provide overly optimistic projections to justify its lending activity.
To more clearly demonstrate the interaction effects, Fig. 2 shows the marginal effects of
UN voting and, respectively, pre-election periods. As can be seen in Fig. 2a, countries voting
against the United States in the UN General Assembly receive significantly higher inflation
forecasts at election time. Countries that side with the United States, however, receive lower
forecasts as elections approach. The finding is significant at the 0.10 level. If favorable in-
flation forecasts help win elections, it pays to be a friend of the United States. Contrary to
the OLS estimates discussed above, Fig. 2b shows that in pre-election periods countries get
a significant discount on their forecast when they vote in line with the United States. Our
result is consistent with the idea that the IMF may be tempted to produce forecasts biased
in favor of “friends” of its major shareholder and treat countries that are not friends of the
United States unfavorably.
Table 4 tests the robustness of these results. We replicate the analysis—with both OLS
and GMM—excluding high-income OECD countries from our sample (columns (1) and
(2)) and separating countries with high and low country risk ratings, as produced by Institu-
tional Investor (columns (3)–(6)).17 The rationale for these robustness tests rests in the way
forecasts are made. To some extent, the IMF’s economic forecasts are the result of an inter-
action between those responsible for compiling the forecasts at the IMF and members of the
various area departments who frequently have access to official national forecasts for the
countries under investigation (Kenen and Schwartz 1986). Excluding high-income OECD
countries might be important, as interactions between IMF staff members and country offi-
cials might be different in these countries as compared to the rest of the sample.18 Arguing
along similar lines, we would also expect interactions between staff and country officials to
be different in countries with high as compared to low credit risk.
As can be seen from the table, excluding high-income OECD countries does not affect
the results (Table 4, columns (1) and (2)). However, some differences arise when we exclude
17Institutional Investor publishes a rating specifically for “country credit” (essentially, sovereign risk). We
thank Carmen Reinhart for providing these data (as used in Reinhart et al. 2003).
18We do not report separate results for OECD countries due to the small number of observations.
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Fig. 2 Marginal effect on the bias in INFLATION forecasts, Table 3, column (6). The graph depicts 90%
confidence intervals
the countries in the top four percentiles of the country-risk ratings. We choose this cut-off
as it splits the sample approximately in half.19
According to the OLS estimates in column (3), we find that the IMF loan share is sig-
nificant at conventional levels and with the expected sign. Surprisingly, the fixed exchange
rate regime is not significant any more, but, consistent with H1, we find higher GDP in-
duces more optimistic inflation forecasts. In the GMM specification most of the results are
consistent with those previously obtained but with some differences: the lagged dependent
variable is now significant and, surprisingly, both higher GDP and being a temporary UNSC
member induce less optimistic inflation forecasts.
Finally, where we strongly reduce our sample in order to include only countries with
high-risk ratings (last two columns), we obtain coefficients that are significant only with
the GMM specification. As before, we find that inflation forecasts are more optimistic for
countries voting in line with the United States at election times (where the pre-election
index is still positive and significant) and for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes.
For obvious reasons, the share of a country’s debt in the IMF loan portfolio is not significant
here. With riskier countries, the IMF needs to be cautious.
Turning to our estimates of growth forecast bias, Table 5, column (4), presents the OLS
estimates for the full model. As can be seen, the forecast error is positively related to the
forecast itself. Most of our hypotheses, however, receive no support. The only hypothesis
that is not rejected by the data is H2: countries voting in line with the United States obtain
more optimistic forecasts. None of the other variables are significant, with the exception of
the variable indicating the number of years consecutively spent under an IMF program; but
19In the OLS model sample. Note that—due to the inclusion of an AR(1) term—we loose a substantial
number of observations in the OLS regressions as compared to the GMM specification.
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Table 4 Explaining the bias in INFLATION forecasts (tests for robustness)
w/o OECD w/o OECD w/o high w/o high w/o low w/o low
countries countries risk risk risk risk
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast (t) 1.125 0.109 1.380 0.812 1.376 0.153
(14.87)a (1.44) (21.84)a (3.60)a (9.99)a (2.64)a
GDP (log) 0.328 0.513 41.887 0.948 −0.118 1.120
(0.30) (0.60) (3.54)a (2.36)b (0.18) (1.17)
Arrears (relative to GDP) −74.665 34.875 −363.031 92.380 26.509 54.782
(2.15)b (0.54) (4.76)a (1.61) (0.96) (0.91)
UNSC dummy 0.219 2.652 −0.222 1.388 1.261 2.291
(0.13) (1.28) (0.21) (1.86)c (0.32) (0.78)
Voting with United States −5.486 −6.166 −16.046 0.877 −11.540 −5.312
(0.39) (1.37) (1.01) (0.18) (1.17) (0.76)
Pre-election period 12.920 11.426 8.425 8.537 −9.909 10.654
(2.52)b (2.63)a (3.61)a (2.73)a (1.10) (2.30)b
Voting*pre-election −33.482 −27.549 −15.875 −14.880 20.644 −19.036
(2.19)b (1.91)c (3.11)a (2.08)b (0.94) (2.28)b
IMF loan share −13.010 −42.204 −124.705 −63.519 −674.900 −4.086
(0.16) (2.24)b (1.79)c (3.42)a (0.46) (0.15)
Consecutive IMF arrangements 0.153 0.150 0.589 0.050 −0.072 0.212
(0.44) (0.95) (1.12) (0.17) (0.29) (1.20)
Fixed exchange rate −0.744 −2.766 −0.512 −0.804 0.054 −1.082
(1.80)c (1.98)b (1.28) (2.02)b (0.13) (1.71)c
Lagged dependent variable −0.024 0.568 −0.033
(0.22) (2.39)b (0.33)
Constant −12.582 −1.447 −1,077.016 −25.439 −1.054 −21.543
(0.74) (0.07) (6.80)a (2.61)a (0.09) (1.07)
Observations 257 259 169 171 113 190
Number of countries 109 110 53 54 54 131
Arellano–Bond Test (p-level) 0.09 0.53 0.98
Sargan–Hansen Test (p-level) 0.45 0.98 0.90
Notes: The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). OLS regressions include fixed
country dummies; t-statistics are reported in parentheses
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
cSignificant at 10%
the coefficient has the “wrong” sign: countries with longer histories with the IMF receive
overly pessimistic growth forecasts. While there is plenty of evidence that IMF programs are
bad for economic growth,20 it seems that even the IMF itself is too pessimistic for countries
with a long history of IMF arrangements.
20See Dreher (2006) and Vreeland (2007) for a review.
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Table 5 Explaining the bias in GROWTH forecasts
HP1 HP2 HP3 HP4 ALL HP ALL HP
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast (t) 0.802 0.792 0.800 0.741 0.763 0.008
(4.18)a (4.20)a (4.18)a (3.87)a (3.98)a (0.03)
GDP (log) −2.085 −1.465 −1.425 −1.378 −1.262 −0.092
(2.23)b (1.59) (1.56) (1.44) (1.28) (0.51)
Arrears (relative to GDP) −7.449 −7.700 −8.776 −4.744 −33.970
(0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.25) (0.83)
UNSC dummy −0.538 −0.549 −0.547 −0.557 −0.410
(0.75) (0.76) (0.77) (0.79) (1.12)
Voting with United States 21.566 21.464 20.496 20.521 2.243
(4.13)a (4.07)a (3.93)a (3.96)a (1.65)c
Pre-election period 0.743 0.576 0.578 1.208
(0.42) (0.32) (0.33) (0.83)
Voting*pre-election −1.471 −0.964 −1.176 −1.212
(0.37) (0.24) (0.30) (0.46)
IMF loan share −2.714 −5.891 4.483
(0.12) (0.26) (1.00)
Consecutive IMF arrangements −0.428 −0.474 0.006
(2.40)b (2.62)a (0.13)
Short-term debt −14.531 −4.470
(1.39) (1.30)
Lagged dependent variable 0.346
(2.98)a
Constant 47.464 25.213 24.277 24.375 22.275 1.485
(2.42)b (1.30) (1.27) (1.20) (1.05) (0.32)
Observations 414 414 408 408 408 406
Number of countries 157 157 151 151 151 151
Arellano–Bond Test (p-level) 0.85
Sargan–Hansen Test (p-level) 0.67
Notes: The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). OLS regressions include fixed
country dummies; t-statistics are reported in parentheses
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
cSignificant at 10%
In the GMM specification (last column of Table 5) the only variable that is sig-
nificant with the expected sign is voting in line with the United States. This confirms
again our hypothesis that friends of the IMF’s most important shareholder do obtain
more optimistic growth forecasts. The result is robust to the exclusion of high-income
OECD countries (first column in Table 6) and, consistently, to the exclusion of low-
risk countries (column (5), Table 6). Quite surprisingly, however, the coefficient on UN
voting becomes significantly negative once countries with high-risk ratings are excluded
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Table 6 Explaining the bias in GROWTH forecasts (tests for robustness)
w/o OECD w/o OECD w/o high w/o high w/o low w/o low
countries countries risk risk risk risk
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Forecast (t) 0.788 −0.001 1.763 0.344 0.901 −0.256
(3.14)a (0.00) (8.11)a (0.97) (2.15)b (0.58)
GDP (log) −1.202 −0.111 −38.377 −0.044 0.253 0.673
(0.95) (0.42) (7.12)a (0.09) (0.33) (2.18)b
Arrears (relative to GDP) −8.432 −32.330 −98.690 −67.265 −9.382 −5.941
(0.38) (0.83) (3.01)a (1.78)c (0.44) (0.14)
UNSC dummy −0.247 −0.243 −0.561 −0.789 3.604 −0.042
(0.24) (0.41) (0.78) (1.38) (1.23) (0.03)
Voting with United States 25.573 1.570 −32.289 3.312 10.323 0.107
(3.73)a (0.82) (3.35)a (1.07) (1.70)c (0.04)
Pre-election period −1.631 −0.976 1.815 −0.021 −12.883 −1.595
(0.48) (0.37) (1.06) (0.01) (2.43)b (0.68)
Voting*pre-election 5.996 6.131 −7.119 −1.217 34.469 1.849
(0.56) (0.72) (1.82)c (0.45) (2.49)b (0.29)
IMF loan share −7.147 5.482 −21.993 7.051 995.463 −23.816
(0.27) (0.82) (1.15) (1.29) (1.16) (2.66)a
Consecutive IMF arrangements −0.469 −0.005 0.151 −0.007 −0.339 0.150
(2.21)b (0.09) (0.41) (0.03) (1.77)c (1.76)c
Short-term debt −13.804 −3.841 2.651 8.819 −10.442 −0.720
(1.12) (1.05) (0.12) (0.42) (1.02) (0.26)
Lagged dependent variable 0.354 0.170 0.261
(3.17)a (0.86) (1.55)
Constant 19.480 2.065 995.474 −0.720 −14.721 −15.464
(0.73) (0.34) (7.72)a (0.05) (0.96) (1.94)c
Observations 302 300 192 193 133 213
Number of countries 128 128 60 61 67 149
Arellano–Bond Test (p-level) 1.00 0.99 0.80
Sargan–Hansen Test (p-level) 0.36 0.75 0.48
Notes: The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast minus realization). OLS regressions include fixed
country dummies; t-statistics are reported in parentheses
aSignificant at 1%
bSignificant at 5%
cSignificant at 10%
(column (3), Table 6). Overall, therefore, our hypotheses clearly find less support for
growth, as compared to inflation forecasts. As possible explanation, growth forecasts
might be more widely debated than inflation forecasts, requiring the IMF to be more cau-
tious.
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We conclude this section by presenting some of the interesting but somewhat complex
effects of politics with some examples from the data.21 Table 7 elaborates on the interactive
effect of elections and alliance with the United States on forecast bias for inflation. Here,
we rely on the conservative GMM estimates (Table 3, column (6)). Consider France, which
voted with the United States in 2001 at a relatively high rate (0.54). That year, actual inflation
in France was 1.8%. But with elections on the horizon during the preceding year, the IMF
underpredicted inflation by 0.7%. Note that this is a substantial error, representing 39%
of the realized value. Our prediction is in the right direction for this case:22 −1.8%. We
similarly predict forecast bias of −1.8% for other friends of the United States, Poland and
Romania. Both had voting records similar to that of the United States in 2000 and had
elections on the horizon. For countries that were less friendly to the United States, such as
Argentina, our model predicts a forecast bias in the other direction. With elections on the
horizon, we expect the IMF to over-inflate the inflation forecast by 0.4%, although in this
case the IMF actually did much worse, overpredicting by 34.6%. A more typical case is
Kenya, whose voting correlation was 0.21. With elections on the horizon, we expect the bias
to be 2.7%. In fact, the IMF was off by three percent. Considering that inflation was actually
just two percent that year, this was a substantively important bias.
Table 7 also lists some cases of the more straightforward effect of voting in line with
the United States for growth forecasts. We did not find the interaction with elections to be
significant, so the interpretation with being close to the United States is straightforward: the
closer to the United States, the greater the growth forecast bias. Some interesting cases in-
clude powerful G7 countries, such as Germany, France, Canada, and Italy, as well as faithful
and strong allies, such as Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Albania, and Uzbekistan. At the other
end of the spectrum are countries like Bolivia, Venezuela, and Iran. In between, are countries
like Ireland and Guatemala. For a typical middle country, like Guatemala in 2001, whose
voting correlation with the United States is 0.33, our model expects overprediction of growth
by 0.7%. In fact, the IMF did overpredict growth by just that. The error is substantial; con-
sidering that actual growth was 2.3% that year, the bias represents 30% of the realized value.
Due to the large-N nature of our statistical study, we cannot know if any of the cases
presented in Table 7 represent actual instances where intentional adjustment of the forecast
took place. Case study analysis—and insider knowledge—would be necessary to establish
such a claim. From casual conversations from insiders at the IMF, we do know that adjust-
ments take place. The question is whether this activity leads to systematic forecast bias. No
estimation approach should be expected to perform perfectly. Many of the cases in the data
certainly represent errors resulting directly from the econometric model used by the IMF to
forecast, as well as honest mistakes in adjusting the initial model results. We should point
out that there also are cases in the data that our forecast bias model does not predict well. We
predict positive bias in favor of the United Kingdom, for example, but find little evidence
21For excellent discussions of understanding interaction terms, see Brambor et al. (2005) and Clark et al.
(2006).
22Note that we do not adjust for any of the other control variables in the specification. Because we are
focusing on the impact of the interacted variables (Voting with United States and Pre-election period), we
report only their contribution to the expected forecast bias. Following the notation from equation 5, we report
the impact of “Voting” and “Election” for the case of France, 2001:
βVotingVotingFrance,2001 + βElectionElectionFrance,2001 + βInteractionVoting · ElectionFrance,2001.
Of course other variables impacted this case, but the purpose of this exercise is to focus on the interaction of
these particular variables; so we have effectively set all other variables to zero for presentation purposes in
Table 7.
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Table 7 Impact of UN voting and elections, selected countries, 2005
Inflation: The predicted impact of UN voting and elections
Country Year Voting with Portion of prior year Actual Actual fore- Predicted impact of
United States preceding elections inflation cast error voting and elections
Favorable bias
Poland 2000 0.54 0.54 10.1 −4.6 −1.8
France 2001 0.54 0.58 1.8 −0.7 −1.8
Romania 2000 0.53 0.92 45.7 −28.9 −1.8
Moldova 2000 0.52 0.75 31.3 −25.4 −1.7
Bulgaria 2001 0.49 0.71 7.5 −3.0 −1.4
Unfavorable bias
Peru 2000 0.38 1.00 3.8 1.5 0.3
Argentina 2003 0.32 0.67 13.4 34.6 0.4
Sudan 2000 0.29 1.00 8.0 1.0 1.6
Armenia 2002 0.29 0.71 1.1 1.9 0.9
Columbia 2001 0.25 0.67 8.0 0.8 1.2
Panama 2003 0.23 0.58 0.6 1.0 1.1
Nigeria 2002 0.22 0.67 13.7 3.4 1.5
Kenya 2002 0.21 1.00 2.0 3.0 2.7
Growth: The predicted impact of UN voting
Country Year Voting with Actual Actual fore- Predicted impact
United States growth cast error of voting
High bias
France 2003 0.52 0.9 1.4 1.2
Germany 2003 0.51 −0.2 2.2 1.2
Albania 2003 0.51 5.7 1.3 1.1
Canada 2003 0.50 2 1.4 1.1
Denmark 2003 0.48 0.7 1.5 1.1
Portugal 2003 0.48 −1.1 2.6 1.1
Italy 2002 0.47 0.3 1.7 1.1
Poland 2002 0.47 1.4 2.3 1.0
Uzbekistan 2003 0.46 1.5 1.5 1.0
Medium bias
Ireland 2003 0.43 4.4 0.9 1.0
Guatemala 2001 0.33 2.3 0.7 0.7
Malawi 2003 0.29 3.9 0.6 0.7
Low bias
Bolivia 2003 0.24 2.8 −0.3 0.5
Brazil 2004 0.20 4.9 −1.9 0.5
China 2003 0.19 10 −2.8 0.4
Iran 2003 0.19 6.7 −1.2 0.4
Guyana 2004 0.17 1.6 0.4 0.4
Venezuela 2004 0.14 17.9 −10.2 0.3
Note: Estimates for inflation (growth) are based on column (6) of Table 3 (Table 5). The predicted forecast
bias shows our predictions of the change in the IMF’s ex ante forecasts due to a country’s UN voting pattern
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of such bias in the data. Errors of positive and negative bias should, however, cancel out in
the aggregate. When it comes to IMF forecasting they do not. Like the studies before ours,
we detect systematic bias in IMF forecasting. And when we regress forecast error on the
characteristics of specific countries, we find evidence supporting the hypotheses of political
influence, defensive forecasting, and adjusting for the IMF mandate of global economic sta-
bility. We should not find such evidence unless people on either the staff or the Executive
Board (or both) systematically deviate from the econometric forecasting model.
7 Conclusion
Following the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, calls came from across the politi-
cal spectrum for the IMF to get out of the lending business. The calls were heard. These days
lending is way down at the IMF. Emerging market countries are finding alternatives to IMF
loans that are not conditioned on the Fund’s recommended policy reforms. The IMF finds
itself tightening its belt as the revenue it has generated in the past from lending is beginning
to dry up. Like many times in its past, the IMF is looking for a new primary purpose from
among the various functions laid out in the Articles of Agreement.
The IMF’s new raison d’etre appears to be surveillance. Already accounting for the
largest part of its budgetary resources, Managing Director Rodrigo de Rato announced in
2006 that the IMF would explore “new directions in surveillance,” including strengthening
the analysis presented in the WEO:
The difficulties in tackling unprecedented global imbalances and the challenges facing
individual countries underscore the need for stronger exercise of the Fund’s policy
analysis and advice to its member countries, a process known as surveillance.23
Past lending activities of the IMF have been plagued by political problems, both interna-
tional and domestic. These problems contributed to the disappointing results that prompted
calls for the IMF to cut back its lending activities. As the IMF shifts focus from “lender” to
“monitor,” it is important to ask whether political problems will still plague its activities.
Using panel data for a maximum of 157 countries over the period 1999–2005, we have
investigated empirically the politics involved in IMF economic forecasts. We find a system-
atic bias in growth and inflation forecasts. Our results indicate that countries voting in line
with the United States in the UN General Assembly receive better inflation and—depending
on the sample of countries included in the analysis—growth forecasts. As the United States
is the Fund’s major shareholder this result supports the hypothesis that the Fund’s forecasts
are not based purely on economic considerations. Our results also confirm the defensive
forecasting hypothesis: inflation forecasts are systematically biased downwards for coun-
tries more heavily indebted to the IMF.
What policy conclusions can be drawn from these results? As for reforming the Fund, we
should be cautious. As argued in Dreher et al. (2006, 2008), it may be that the very prospect
of manipulating the Fund for political goals is a necessary condition for its major sharehold-
ers to lend their financial support to the international institution. So, perhaps the political
manipulation of international institutions is an evil necessary to engage the participation
of powerful countries in international cooperation. Even if non-politically motivated institu-
tions might be preferable to politically motivated ones, this may not be a realistic alternative.
23The IMF “Medium Term Strategy”: http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2006/041806.htm (accessed
9 September 2007). See Vreeland (2006) for a discussion.
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The alternative to a world with politically manipulated international institutions may simply
be a world without international institutions. One must therefore weigh the costs of political
manipulation against the benefits of having various institutions that facilitate multilateral
deliberations.
With the above caveats in mind, our suggestions for reform are conservative. We do
believe that there is room for improvement, to the extent that long-run economic gains matter
more than short-run political gains. Perhaps much like central banks are isolated from the
vagaries of day-to-day politics, the Fund can be reformed to provide the country-appointed
executive directors with a little more independence from political pressures and still provide
the major shareholders with strong enough voices to maintain their support of the institution.
For example, the Fund’s directors could be appointed for long, non-renewable terms during
which they could represent the long-run interests of their respective countries.
If the IMF is to remain relevant by increasing its surveillance endeavors, Fund forecasts
must be free from political and opportunistic bias. Economic agents might have rational
expectations, and if the Fund provides forecasts that are systematically biased, its credibility
is going to be seriously damaged. As surveillance becomes the central focus of IMF activity,
if the Fund wants to be credible, it should also make sure that the evaluation of forecasts
becomes a central part of the research agenda of the international institution. The importance
of forecasting requires scholars of the IMF to investigate whether and to what extent IMF
surveillance is laden with political and self-serving interests.
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics (estimation sample Table 3, column (5))
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bias, inflation 0.14 11.09 −59.90 157.20
Bias, growth −0.32 3.14 −22.20 13.50
Forecast, inflation 8.11 32.88 −2.20 522.20
Forecast, growth 4.05 2.53 −4.50 42.70
GDP (log) 24.18 2.27 19.12 30.01
Arrears (relative to GDP) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.18
UNSC dummy 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Pre-election period 0.12 0.21 0.00 1.00
Voting with United States at the UNGA 0.35 0.15 0.10 0.95
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IMF loan share 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.27
Consecutive IMF arrangements 1.68 3.09 0.00 15.00
Fixed exchange rate 3.72 1.41 1.00 5.00
Short-term debt (relative to GDP) 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.56
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